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1
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from proceedings in a district court
concerning an action by shareholders against related corporations
and their principals. The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction
under Subsection 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. This Court now
has jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(k) since the
Supreme Court transferred this case on November 2, 1992 in accordance
with Subsection 78-2-2(4).
The Notice of Appeal filed June 23f 1992 (ROA at 696)
conferred jurisdiction to review all Orders and Judgment adverse
to plaintiffs and made final by the Order Certifying Order and
Summary Judgment as Final Judgment dated June 1, 1992.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellants assert that the pertinent issues and the
corresponding standard of review are as follows:
1.

Should the plaintiff class have been certified under

Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in
the alternative under Rule 23(b)(3), where the proposed class
consists of 105 holders of preferred stock having claims based on
facts such as the company failing to pay dividends, and certain
insiders selling all of their preferred stock to a controlled
company at a price per share over 16 times as great as the members
of the prooosed class could obtain?

This is a question of whether

the trial court misapplied the law, for which no deference is
owed, or abused its discretion.
(Utah 1986).

Call v. West Jordan, 727 P. 2d 180

2
2.

Where over one-third (based on liquidation rights)

of the stock in a holding company is purchased by the company it
controlsf has there been "any liquidation" under its 1944 Amended
Articles of Incorporation entitling its shareholders to be paid in
the manner prescribed therein?

This is a question of lawf with no

need for deference to the trial court's decision.

Transamerica

Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power & Water, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990).
3.

Are a controlled company and its officers and

shareholders insulated from any fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of its holding company?

This is a question of lawf with no need

for deference to the trial court's decision.
4.

Id.

In order to resolve disputes over a corporation's

control, does the business judgment rule justify that corporation's
secretly purchasing of all of certain insiders' preferred stock of
its holding company at a price per share over 16 times as great as
the price the other holders of that stock could obtain from the
corporation or anyone else?

This is a question of law, with no

need for deference to the trial court's decision.
5.

Id.

Must every action for breach of fiduciary duty of

the officers and directors of a corporation be brought as a derivative
action?

This is a question of law, with no need for deference to

the trial court's decision.
6.

Id.

May punitive damages be awarded against the officers

and directors for breach of fiduciary duty when only equitable
relief involving the company, and no general or compensatory
damages from the officers and directors, is specifically sought?

3
This is a question of law, with no need for deference to the trial
court's decision.
7.

Id.

Were plaintiffs entitled to amend their Complaints

to allege additional acts of oppression against the minority
shareholders and to specifically claim a right to a partial rescission
of a sale of stock when the case was still in the discovery and
motion stage?

This involves a question as to whether the trial

court abused its discretion.

Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360

(Utah 1984).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The interpretation of the following Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is determinative of certain issues in this appeal:
Rule 15 provides in pertinent part:
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
Rule 23 is set forth in the addendum at the end of this
Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are holders of preferred stock in defendant
Insurance Investment Company ("II").

II holds most of the voting

stock of the defendant Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company
("Equitable").

These companies and their principal officers,

R. Earl Ross ("Earl") and E. Roderick Ross ("Rod"), are all jointly
referred to as the "Equitable defendants", and sometimes herein as
"defendants".
Plaintiff Leontine C. Pond ("Pond"), and later plaintiff

4
Merle G. Hyer Company ("Hyer"), have sought to represent a class
composed of all holders of II preferred stock, except for Earl,
Rod, and their relatives ("the Ross family").

The trial court

declined to certify this plaintiff class.
Although since the early 1940's Equitable has grown and
been quite profitable, the plaintiff class has never shared any
benefits arising therefrom, nor are any foreseeable.

A share of

II preferred stock sold during World War II at a par value of $1
and now represents a liquidation value of over $80.

Nevertheless

dividends have never been greater than $.06 per share, and have
only been declared 3 times in the last 35 years.

There is no

market for the stock, but members of the Ross family have been
willing to pay around $3 per share for it.
In 1986 a dispute among members of the Ross family
developed over control of Equitable.

The following year, in order

to end this dispute, the members in the minority were essentially
allowed to liquidate their direct and indirect ownership interest
in Equitable.

Equitable bought all of their stock interest,

including II preferred stock, for an amount approximating its
liquidation value.

This was paid in the form of cash and a new

issue of Equitable preferred stock, with the latter likely to be
redeemed over a period of about 10 years.
Although this transaction was to be kept secret, it
became apparent that some transaction had been consummated.

After

this action was initiated, and a motion to compel was granted,
discovery revealed most of the pertinent facts.

5
Plaintiffs sued on several bases, including the premise
that since a de facto partial liquidation had taken place, they
should be entitled to participate therein.

The trial court ruled

that they failed to state a cause of action on that basis.
Plaintiffs also based their suit on the premise that
fiduciary duties were violated when defendants used the assets of
Equitable to benefit only certain shareholders, namely, the Ross
family shareholders that were bought out.

The trial court eventually

granted defendants summary judgment on this issue as well, apparently
on the basis of the presumption that defendants1 actions were
taken in good faith reliance on their business judgment. The
Equitable defendants had also argued that there could be no liability
for punitive damages in the absence of a prayer for actual damages;
that II was not involved in any transaction and plaintiffs were not
shareholders of Equitable, and so Equitable owed them no fiduciary
duty; and that Pond and Hyer had no cause of action as individual
shareholders.
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include
a cause of action based on oppressive treatment of the minority
shareholders.

That motion was denied.

Only the Equitable defendants have vigorously defended
this action, and the orders and judgment have only been applicable
to them.

Nevertheless, these orders are appealable since the

trial court certified the Order and Summary Judgment as final.
The facts in more detail are as follows:
1.

Pond is a resident of Lewiston, Cache County, State

6
of Utah, and Hyer is a Utah corooration doing business in that same
city and county.
2.

ROA at 2f 158.

Defendants Equitable and II are Utah corporations

doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and defendants
Earl and Rod are residents of that same county.
3.

ROA at 158-9, 205.

Pond was issued her 500 shares of II preferred stock

after the death of her husband/ Stillman H. Pond, upon the cancellation
of the certificates that had been issued to him when he purchased
them during their marriage in the early 1940's. ROA at 3.
4.

Hyer is and has been at least since November of 1970

the owner of 1,175 shares of preferred stock of II.
5.

ROA at 159, 206.

There are a total of about 105 persons, including

the named plaintiffs, who are similarly situated, and who together
hold about 30% of the II preferred stock which is outstanding.
ROA at 63, 475-76.
6.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, plaintiffs Pond and Hyer sought to bring this action as
a class action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other
similarly situated owners of preferred stock in II.
7.

ROA at 5, 160-61.

All other holders of preferred shares in II are

similarly situated to plaintiffs except the named individual
defendants and their close relatives who with them make or made up
the Ross Family.
8.

ROA 475-76.

Many stockholders of this proposed class are probably

not residents of this state, and the names of some stockholders
are unknown to plaintiffs Pond and Hyer and cannot with due diligence
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be ascertained by them.

ROA at 160, 207. However, an effort to

bring them all before the court has met with some limited success
as indicated by the attempted intervention of eleven other plaintiffs.
ROA at 493, 532.
9.

The attorneys for the plaintiffs are experienced

and capable in litigation in the field of corporate law and have
actively conducted and been responsible for the plaintiffs1 case
herein.

ROA at 2, 5, 38.
10.

stock.

II is a holding company, holding Equitable common

ROA at 475. As of October 31, 1986, Equitable only had one

class of stock outstanding, and II owned about 63.3% of that Equitable
stock.

ROA at 7, 39.
11.

At that time II held approximately 3.717 shares of

Equitable common stock for each share of its own stock outstanding,
common and preferred.
12.

ROA at 15, 38.

Under the Amended Articles of Incorporation of

II dated July 17, 1944, in "the event of any liquidation" of II,
the holders of the preferred stock would be entitled to be paid at
least as much for one of their shares as would be paid for each
share of II common stock.
13.

ROA at 9-10, 42.

On November 17, 1986, Equitable offered to purchase

up to 115,500 shares of its own stock for $22.50 per share on or
before December 3, 1986.
14.

ROA at 6-7, 39.

Pursuant to that offer, Equitable paid a total of

$2,152,404 for its own stock.
from II.

No Equitable stock was purchased

Deposition of Earl Roderick Ross taken June 10, 1991 -
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ROA at 759, 549 (Rod Depo), Exh. 1, 4th page; Addendum hereto,
15.

Very few purchases of Equitable stock had taken

place during the preceeding five years. The purchase price ranged
from about $2.00 to $4.00 per share.

It was not listed on any

exchange and no over-the-counter sales were made.
16.

ROA at 7, 39.

In fact, during those preceeding five years, only

members of the Ross family would purchase Equitable or IT oreferre
stock, and then only for less than $5 per share.
120-21.

Rod Depo at

Deposition of Raymond Earl Ross taken June 11, 1991 - ROA

at 760, 549 (Earl Depo) at 67-71.
17.

As of October 31, 1986, the Ross Family owned or

controlled all or nearly all of the voting common stock of II and
about 70% of the II preferred stock.
18.

ROA at 475-78.

As of October 31, 1986, three members oE the Ross

Family, Earl, Rod, Diane Ross Worthen (now known as Diane Ross
Gandre), served as directors of II and Equitable.
19.

Rod Depo at 27,

Rod and Earl determined that with the stock owned

or beneficially owned by themselves and by Earl's sisters and
mother, they could control II, and hence Equitable, if they could
control most of the stock owned by the Roderick Earl Ross Memorial
Foundation.
20.

Earl Depo at 12, 19.
Since they, along with Earl's sister Diane Gandre,

were three of the three or four trustees of the Foundation, they
arranged for a sale of about 1,200 shares of the Foundation's
II common stock to Jim Bowlden for about $30 a share, or a total
of about $35,000.

Earl Depo at 11, 14.

9
21.

Defendant Galen Ross objected to this sale by

the Foundation, and submitted an offer for the same stock for a
total of less than $100 more.

Earl Depo at 17-18.

Despite this

objection, the sale took place in 1986, which effectively resulted
in the complete control of Equitable by Earl and Rod.
at 10-14. Rod Depo at 11-13.

Various other takeover attempts and

litigation began after that sale.
22.

Earl Depo

ROA at 476-77.

Earl and Rod withstood the threats to their control

of Equitable by means of litigation and through Equitablefs said
purchase of its own stock set forth above.
23.

ROA at 477.

The threat to Earl and Rod's control was finally

eliminated by Equitable's secret purchase of all of the II common
and preferred stock and Equitable stock held directly or indirectly
by defendants Galen Ross, Connie Ross, David Ross and Betsy Ross
Rapps, the members of the Ross family who had been pushed from a
position of control. ROA at 437, 476-78.
24.

This was paid in the form of cash and a new issue

of Equitable preferred stock, with the latter likely to be redeemed
over a period of about 10 years.
25.

ROA at 422-30.

The 1988 Annual Statement reported that in the

purchase of its own stock pursuant to the 1986 offer, and in the
purchase from "a coalition," Equitable paid a total consideration
of $6,809,596 for the equivalent of 300,609 of its own shares, or
an average of $22.65 per share.

As part of this purchase, Equitable

bought over one-third (based on liquidation rights) of the outstandi
II stock.

Rod Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page, included in the Addendum here
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26.

That same 1988 Annual Statement reported that

each share it held of II stock, both common and preferred, was
equivalent to 3.717 shares of its own stock "(based on liquidation
rights)."

Id..

Thus those same liquidation rights would result in

an average value of over $84 per share of II stock.
27.

In 1988 Jim Bowlden sold the II common stock he

held to Earl's mother for a little over $100,000, or a little over
$83 per share.
28.

Earl Depo at 15.
When equitable made that secret purchase of stock,

including II preferred stock, from the said "coalition" of insiders,
it made no comparable offer to purchase the II preferred stock
held by the plaintiff class, which would have meant an additional
investment of less than $1,730,000.
29.

ROA at 11, 43.

All of Earl's sisters are now serving as directors

of Equitable, namely Lana Ross Hall, Rita Mahmood, and Julie
Foster, the latter serving without voting powers.

Earl Depo at

22, Rod Depo at 117.
30.

Each director of Equitable receives an annual

compensation for being a director of at least $10,000.
Depo at 22.

Earl

The total earnings of Earl and Rod have not been

disclosed, in accordance with their attorney's direction.
Depo at 4.

Earl.

Earl's sisters all work for Equitable and receive

additional annual compensation of about $75,000.
31.

Earl Depo at 23.

Dividends have been declared or paid by II in

only very few years since the issuance of the preferred stock
therein, and then only at the minimum rate, 6% of the $1 par
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value,

IT has indicated that dividends have been paid to the

preferred shareholders of II on four occasions, namely, in 1954,
1981, 1983 and 1984, and seven times total.
32.

ROA 211-12, 500.

Pond initiated this action by means of a Complaint

dated September 21, 1989, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated holders of preferred stock in II.

ROA at 2.

She then filed a Motion for Maintenance as Class Action dated
September 22, 1989.
33.

ROA at 18.

The Equitable defendants opposed that motion,

arguing that 105 members of the class were not numerous enough;
Pond was not typical since others had not expressed an interest in
joining the lawsuit; she had only 2% of the II preferred stock and
she and her counsel had not proven they could adequately represent
the class.

ROA at 60.
34.

This opposition proved successful, with the trial

court denying Pond's Motion by means of a Minute Entry dated
November 22, 1989.

ROA at 84.

The court later clarified that its

basis for the denial was that the case was not the type appropriately
pursued as a class action.

The court also stated that additional

authority on the matter would be considered.
35.

ROA at 738.

Pursuant to that invitation, Pond filed a Renewed

Motion for Maintenance as Class Action dated February 13, 1990 and
supported it by extensive citation to case law.

ROA at 103.

That

Renewed Motion was denied by means of an Order dated June 20,
1990.

ROA at 218.
36.

Meanwhile, the parties had stipulated on May 22,

12
1990 to the intervention of plaintiff Hyer, and had acknowledged
the filing of its Complaint dated April 18, 1990 in which it
sought to be a class representative along with Pond.

ROA at 201,

158.
37.

To discover the pertinent documents despite the secrecy

agreed upon among the defendants, plaintiffs obtained an Order
Compelling Production.
38.

ROA at 275.

The Equitable defendants filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment dated August 8, 1990, in which they sought a
dismissal of all claims against them based on the existence of a
de facto partial liquidation of II.

ROA at 269.

October 24, 1990 granted that Motion.
39.

An Order dated

ROA at 317.

The Equitable defendants subsequently filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment as to all remaining issues, dated
September 24, 1991.

ROA at 390.

In support of that Motion they

argued, among other matters, that there could be no liability for
punitive damages in the absence of a prayer for actual damages;
II was not involved in any transaction and plaintiffs were not
shareholders of Equitable, and so Equitable owed them no fiduciarv
duty; that their actions were justified on the basis of business
judgment; and that Pond and Hyer had no cause of action as individual
shareholders.
40.

ROA at 484, 393.
Pond and Hyer opposed that Motion and filed a a

proposed Amended Complaint showing the proposed intervention of
eleven (11) additional representative plaintiffs, and including
and clarifying the causes of action for oppressive conduct and for
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the alternative right to partial rescission so that all shareholders
would have the right to sell an equal percentage of their II
preferred stock to Equitable,
41.

ROA at 495f 529.

However, the trial court granted the Equitable

defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment by means of an Order and
Summary Judgment dated December 9, 1991, and in connection therewith,
refused to allow the Complaint to be amended and denied the additional
intervention.
42.

ROA at 596, 603, 608.
The said Order and Summary Judgment decided all

claims pertaining to the Equitable defendants.

Therefore it was

certified as a final judgment by means of an Order Certifying
Order and Summary Judgment as Final Judgment (Rule 54(b)) dated
June 1, 1992.

ROA at 693.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Since no appealed order or judgment specified any particular
basis, all arguments made by the Equitable defendants are addressed.
1.

The plaintiff class should have been certified under

Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in
the alternative under Rule 23(b)(3).

The proposed class consists

of 105 holders of preferred stock, which is numerous enough.
They all have claims based on facts such as the company
failing to pay dividends, and certain insiders selling all of
their preferred stock to a controlled company at a price per share
over 16 times as great as the members of the proposed class could
obtain.

Thus the similar issues overwhelmingly predominate over

any variation among the members of the class.
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The class is adequately represented by the representative
plaintiffs and their attorneys, and the representative plaintiffs
are typical of the class.
The likely remedies are such that all members of the
class should be included, with no right to opt out.

Although the

plaintiffs have the burden to show a class action is appropriate,
that burden has been met and the class action is favored.
2.

Where over one-third (based on liquidation rights)

of the stock in a holding company is ourchased by the company it
controls, there has been "any liquidation" under its 1944 Amended
Articles of Incorporation, entitling its shareholders to be paid in
the manner prescribed therein.
Whether there has been "any liquidation" is a question
of fact.

"Any liquidation" includes partial liquidation, and is

not limited to any statutory definition.
3.

A controlled company and its officers and shareholders

are not insulated by artificialities from any fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of its holding company.
It is well settled that courts will look to the substance
and actualities, rather than convenient corporate formations, in
order to determine the realities.
4.

A corporation is not justified in secretly purchasing

all of certain insiders1 preferred stock of its holding company,
at a price per share over 16 times as great as the price the other
holders of that stock could obtain from the corporation or anyone
else, especially in order to resolve disputes over a corporation's
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control, despite the business judgment rule.
Equitable had an obligation to offer all holders of II
preferred stock the same price for its stock that it paid to the
insiders for such stock.

Equitable's directors were not excused

by the business judgment rule when they preferentially used the
corporate assets, since the purchase was made to retain control.
5.

Every action for breach of fiduciary duty of the

officers and directors of a corporation need not be brought as a
derivative action.
The shareholders have a claim for direct relief where,
as here, the corporation violated their rights as shareholders.
6.

Punitive damages may be awarded against the officers

and directors for breach of fiduciary duty when only equitable
relief involving the company, and no general or compensatory
damages from the officers and directors, is specified in the prayer.
Equitable relief is sufficient to justify punitive
damages.

Additionally, general or compensatory damages may yet be

awarded, since plaintiffs' remedies are not restricted by the
prayers of their complaints.
The statutory exception as to when punitive damages may
be awarded should be narrowly construed, and not bar punitive
damages where the judgment results in a substantial financial loss
to the defendants.
7.

Plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaints

to allege additional acts of oporession against the minority
shareholders and to specifically claim a right to a oartial rescission
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of a sale of stock when the case was still in the discovery and
motion stage.
An amended complaint can include claims already dismissed
so that they are not deemed waivedr although the law of the case
is applicable.

An added cause of action should be allowed during

the discovery phase when it is based in large part on facts already
pleaded.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED UNDER

RULE 23(B)(1) OR (2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE UNDER RULE 23(B)(3), WHERE THE PROPOSED CLASS
CONSISTS OF 105 HOLDERS OF PREFERRED STOCK HAVING CLAIMS BASED ON
FACTS SUCH AS THE COMPANY FAILING TO PAY DIVIDENDS, AND CERTAIN
INSIDERS SELLING ALL OF THEIR PREFERRED STOCK TO A CONTROLLED
COMPANY AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE MEMBERS
OF THE PROPOSED CLASS COULD OBTAIN.
The class is numerous enough.
Defendants have argued that the class size of 105 preferred
shareholders is insufficient to satisfy the first requirement of
Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the class be
so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.

ROA at 63.

The court in the case of Dameron v. Sinai Hospital of
Baltimore, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (D. Md. 1984) stated,
"A class consisting of as few as 25 to 30 members raises the
presumption that joinder would be impractical."
The case of Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258,
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26 2 (S.D. Cal. 1988) may have put the presumptive figure somewhat
higher.

It stated that generally "classes of 20 are too small,

classes of 20-40 may or may not be big enough depending on the
circumstances of each case, and 40 or more are big enough."
Examples of cases where numerosity was reviewed and the
class certified include Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.y 124
F.R.D. 665 (D. Kan. 1989) with a class of 96, and Cherry Hills
Farms v. City of Cherry Hills, 670 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1983) with a
class of 92.
Clearly the class of 105 preferred shareholders in the
instant matter is numerous enough.
Apparently the trial court agreed on this point.

The

court's stated that the basis for the denial of the Motion for
Maintenance as Class Action was that it did not seem like the tyoe
of a case for a class action.

ROA at 738.

That would not appear

to indicate that at 105 members the class was not numerous enough.
The class is adequately represented.
Defendants have argued that plaintiff Pond (sometimes
referred to herein as plaintiff) is an inadequate representative
of the class because she owns only 2% of the preferred stock
outstanding.

ROA at 65.

Even if this percentage is accurate,

it in no way disqualifies her as a representative.
In the case of Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 391
(E.D. La. 1970) (ROA at 132-36), the court stated, "a single
plaintiff may represent the entire class, no matter how small his
claim may be ....", citing Green v. Wolf Corporation, 406 F.2d
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291 (2nd Cir. 1968) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,
563 (2nd Cir. 1968) .
The Epstein opinion noted that the Green case allowed a
single plaintiff to represent a class exceeding 2f000 shareholders
who purchased stock pursuant to three separate prospectuses,
despite no interventions being filed.

The Eisen ruling allowed a

single odd-lot investor with damages of $70 to represent a class
of some 3,750,000 individuals, that court stating, "If we have to
rely on one litigant to assert the rights of a large class then
rely we must."

391 F.2d at 563.

Defendants contend plaintiff's counsel have not demonstrated
they are capable of representing the intended class of preferred
shareholders.

ROA at 65.

However, the Affidavit of Plaintiff's

Counsel (ROA at 79-81) shows that plaintiff's counsel satisfy the
requirement of adequate representation that "the olaintiff's
attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to
conduct the proposed litigation."

Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

508 F.2d 239, 247, (3rd Cir. 1975), cert, denied 421 U.S. 1011, 95
S.Ct. 2415, 44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975), as cited in 3B Moore's Federal
Practice, (2nd Ed.) 1[23.07[1] at 23-193.
Defendants complained that the plaintiff "made no
demonstration of her financial capability to fund what is inevitably
going to be an expensive lawsuit."

ROA at 65.

Along those same

lines, defendants call into question the ability of plaintiff's
counsel to bear the expenditures of time and money necessary to
vigorously pursue this litigation as a class action.

ROA at 65.
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In the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel, plaintiff's
attorney attested that plaintiff's counsel is wi-^iu .1 id able to
spend the time and advance the necessary costs, and the lack of
prompt reimbursement will in no way compromise the vigorous prosecution
of this litigation.

ROA at 79-81.

Since the class is not extremely

large, costs will not be burdensome.
Since there are no factors present which cast doubt on
plaintiff's ability to reimburse counsel, such as a pending bankruptcy
or financial distress, any contention that plaintiff lacks adequate
financial resources to conduct this litigation is irrelevant.
Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 114 F.R.D. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ROA at 137-139).
Any doubts about adequacy of representation should be
resolved in favor of certification since the "courts presumably
are aware of the irony that a dismissal for inadequacy of
representation may as a practical matter in some situations result
in no representation at all of the class interest."

3B Moore's

Federal Practice , ( 2rid Ed. ) f 23 . 07 [ 1 ] at 23 -1 99 .
Apparently the trial court agreed that the class was
adequately represented since the stated basis for the denial of
certification was that it did not seem like the type of a case for
a class action.

ROA at 738.

The member's desire to join is not an element of typicality.
Defendants have argued that plaintiff has not proven
that she is typical of the class because she has not shown that
other members of the class care whether or not they have a cause
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of action.

ROA at 63-64.

The cases cited do not stand for that

proposition.
The cases of White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412
(1971) and Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th
Cir. 1975) demonstrate the need for each member of the class to have
a legally cognizable claim, not the need for. each member to
subjectively desire to oursue that claim.
Even if a subjective desire to receive the benefits of
the action were necessary, that would be deemed present in the
instant matter.

It is only logical that a shareholder would want

the opportunity to sell his stock for over $80 per share, when he
can presently only sell it for less than $5 per share.
Typicality is satisfied by the similarity of claims.
In the case of Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387
(E.D. La. 1970) (ROA at 132-36), a plaintiff class composed of
selling shareholders was certified in a case alleging violations
of the Securities Exchange Act by reason of misleading information
in the tender offer.
The defendants in that action arqued that a class should
not be certified because of individual issues. They argued that
each member had to establish his own reliance on the tender offer,
show it was material in his decision, and prove the damages he
suffered.

The court rejected this contention on a number of grounds.
Mainly the court found that the common issues of law and

fact predominated over any such individual issues.

Also, it cited

cases showing that materiality had to be measured by an objective
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"reasonable man" standard.

Additionally, it reasoned that since

the shares were so 1 I at 11: 1 e same price pursi 1 ant to the same tender
offer, each member of the class suffered the same loss per share.
Finally, it cited cases showing that where there is nondisclosure,
reliance plays a role that is small or nonexistant.
In another case, Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 114 F.R.D. 48, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ROA at 139), the court
emphasized the need to examine the question of liability in
determinining the issues of commonality and typicality.

It quoted

from the case of Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89
F.R.D. 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) when it stated:

"The typicality

prerequisite requires plaintiff to show that plaintiff's claim
'arises from the same event or course of conduct that gives rise
to claims of other class members and the claims are based on the
same legal theory.'"
In the instant matter, the common factual elements
applicable to all members of the class are that they (1) owned
preferred stock in 11 on or about November 4, 1987, (2) were not
part of the "Ross Family" which controlled well over 90 percent of
the voting stock and about two-thirds of the preferred stock of II
and took the act

• noiained of, a nci (3) • lid not and rould not

participate in :. :ie \ransaction involving the sale of about one-third
of the said shares of II preferred stock to Equitable, and in
fact w<

L supposed to learn about the said transaction, and thus

were left with the ability to sell their stock at only a small fraction
of the amount for which the insiders had sold their stock to the
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company.
All of the members of the class would therefore have the
same cause of action in that they were owed a fiduciary duty as holder;
of preferred stock in II by all of the defendants.

Likewisef the

actions taken by the defendants breached that duty to all of the
members of the class.
The damages are also easily determinable and distributable
among the members of the class.

Whatever is determined to be the

proper remedy for this breach of fiduciary duty should apply to
all of the members of the class in prooortion to their ownership
of preferred stock in II.
Paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of Rule 23 apply.
PARAGRAPH (B)(1)
Paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 23 applies to this case. That
paragraph concerns the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications.
The case of Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Banky 52 F.R.D. 532
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (ROA at 140-41) is instructive on this point.
In that case, a credit card holder brought a class
action to challenge the imposition of a finance charge.

First of

all the court pointed out that "when there is a choice between a
(b)(1) and (b)(3) class action, the court should order that the
suit be maintained as a class action under (b)(1), rather than
under (b)(3)."

_Id. at 534.

The Zachary court then found the existence of the risk
referred to in Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of "inconsistent or varying
adjudications with resoect to individual members of the class
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which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class/1 since "the finance charge exacted by
defendant is either legal or it is illegal as to all members."
Finally, the

Id.

« -et torth in Rule

23(b)(1)(B) of "adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of
the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests".

Id.

Just as the credit card holders in the Zachary case
were all treated the same way with respect to the contested finance
charge, so also in the instant matter were a] ] of the preferred
shareholders other than the defendants subjected to the same
treatment by the insiders.

It is only natural that as a practical

matter, great weight would be given to the decision of the first
court to address these identical issues.
In addition, as indicated in the prayer of the Complaint,
punitive damamges are sought.

Iii practicality and fairness, this

should be applied to all members of the class according to their
respective ownership of preferred shares of II, rather than to
just be awarded to the first shareholder who sues, especially if in
the event that absent class certification, the others would be
barred by a statute of limitation.
In the note of the Rules Advisory Committee oertaining
to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it
sets forth the reasons why actions by shareholders often fit into
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this category:
This clause takes in situations where the
judgment in a nonclass action by or against an
individual member of the class, while not
technically concluding the other members,
might do so as a practical matter. The vice
of an individual action would lie in the fact
that the other members of the class, thus
practically concluded, would have had no
representation in the lawsuit. ... For much
the same reason actions by shareholders to
comoel the declaration of a dividend, the
prooer recognition and handling of redemption
or pre-emption rights, or the like (or actions
by the corporation for corresponding declarations
of rights), should ordinarily be conducted as
class actions although the matter has been
much obscured by the insistence that each
shareholder has an individual claim. [Citations.]
The same reasoning applies to an action which
charges a breach of trust by an indenture
trustee or other fiduciary similarly affecting
the members of a large class of security
holders or other beneficiaries, and which
requires an accounting or like measures to
restore the subject of the trust. [Emphasis
added.]
PARAGRAPH (B)(2)
Turning now to Paragraph (b)(2) of Rule 23, that is
applicable where:
The party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole.
Clearly the first requirement of the grounds being
generally aplicable to the class is met here.

As was just mentioned,

all of the grounds which the representative plaintiff has are
equally applicable to all members of the class.
As to the second requirement, the major relief set forth
in the Complaint is equitable, requiring particular action on
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the part of the defendants with respect to the class as a whole.
Specifically, paragraph l.b. of the prayer would allow Equitable
the option of exchanging its common stock for the II preferred
stock, and tendering a stated amount per share t -» h\v

Yark

that

common stock.
The case of Fradkin v. Ernst, 98 F.R.D. 478, 490-91
(N.D. Ohio 1983) set forth the two part test referred to above,
and found that the oroposed class of shareholders should be certified
since the defendants1 conduct had a similar effect upon all members
of the class and the prayer sought declaratory and injunctive
relief.
There should be no right to opt out and notice is unnecessary.
Not only can and should this lawsuit be pursued on
behalf of the class specified, but it should only be pursued
in that manner, with all members of the class being included.
In paragraoh (c)(3) of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, it draws a distinction between the treatment of
classes meeting the conditions of paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of
that Rule and the treatment of classes meeting the conditions of
paragraph (b)(3).

In the case of the former tyoe of classes, all

members are included and none excluded, thus obviating the need
for notice to determine which members wish to be excluded.

As

shown above, the instant matter should fall into that former category,
including all members of the class regardless of any desires
to be excluded.
In the case of Bowen v. General Motors Corp. A C Spark
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Plug Div., 542 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1981), the court stated
that "notice is descretionary in 23(b)(2) actions and there is no
opt-out privilege given to absent class members."
The case of Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co,, 784 F.2d
1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1986) (ROA at 131) reversed the trial court's
ruling allowing members of the class to opt out.
When there is no right to opt out, notice is unnecessary.
In Fradkin v. Ernst, supra, where there was certification of a
class of 2600 shareholders, the court declined to require notice
be given.

The court in Lindquist v. Bowen, 633 F. Supp. 846,

862 (W.D. Mo. 1986) likewise declined to order notice be given.
The burden of proof for a class action has been met.
Defendants have indicated that plaintiffs bear the
burden to prove that this matter should be maintained as a class
action.

ROA at 61-62.

This burden has been met.

Submitting this factual information in affidavit form is
sufficient.

As was indicated in the case of Genden v. Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 114 F.R.D. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(ROA at 137-39), a motion for class certification can be granted
without "an evidentiary hearing or a 'mini-trial' on the merits of
the complaint."

The Genden court went on to grant such a motion

based on the record and on the affidavits that were submitted.
On the other hand, an evidentiary hearing should be held
before a court dismisses the class aspect of a case.

Rossin

v. Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1973).
Since the plaintiffs' have discharged their obligation
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as to proof, they are entitled to have the class certified.

As

stated in Lindquist v. Bowenf 63^ F, Supp. 846, 860 (W.n. Mo, 1986),
if the requirements for class certification have b^en met , the
plaintiff is entitled to certification.

That is, there is a right

to have the class certified when the requirements are met.
Class actions are favored.
The Tenth Circuit has indicatdd that doubts are to be
resolved in favor of certification:
[T]he interests of justice require that in a
doubtful case, such as was presented here when
considered by the trial court, any error, if
there is to be one, should be committed in
favor of allowing the class action. Esplin
v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968).
This is particularly applicable in act ions involving
stockholders.

As stated in the case of Gruber v. Price Waterhouse,

117 F.R.D. 75, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1987):
Securities actions are particularly suitable
for class action treatment and any doubts
should be resolved in favor of allowing a
class action. Eisenberg v. Gagnonr 766 F..M
770r 78S (3d Cir. 1985).
Not only should any doubt be resolved in favor of certification, but the certification should be under Rule 23(b)(1)
and/or (2) rather than the more restrictive (b)(3).

This princiole

was set forth in Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48
337 ID I !
2.

F.R.D.

333,

1969) (ROA at 122-26).
WHERE OVER ONE-THIRD (BASED ON LIQUIDATION RIGHTS)

OF THE STOCK IN A HOLDING COMPANY IS PURCHASED BY THE COMPANY IT
CONTROLS, THERE HAS BEEN "ANY LIQUIDATION" UNDER ITS 1944 AMENDED
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, ENTITLING ITS SHAREHOLDERS TO BE PAID IN
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THE MANNER PRESCRIBED THEREIN.
Liquidation cannot be ruled absent as a matter of law.
The case of Jones v. Griffin, 216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954)
concerned the appropriate rate of taxation and involved the question
as to whether the purchase by a corporation of its preferred stock
was a partial liquidation.

The ooinion ruled that this question

was a question of fact.
Likewise in the instant matter, the established facts
cannot sustain a ruling as a matter of law that there was not any
liquidation within the meaning of the contractual provisions.
"Any liquidation" includes a partial liquidation.
The case law gives numerous examples of where liquidation
has been determined to have occurred under factual situations
comparable to that of the instant matter.
The Equitable defendants claim that "liquidation is an
all or nothing affair/1 requiring the permanent cessation of
business, the winding up of affairs, and the complete distibution
of all assets, and that no act can be said to be a "partial
liquidation" unless there is a manifest intention and continuing
purpose to terminate and dissolve the corporation.

ROA at 261-62.

Such is not the law.
In the Jones case just citedf the Tenth Circuit uoheld
the jury verdict finding that there was a oartial liquidation
where the corporation purchased its preferred stock from the
holders thereof.

Nevertheless, in that case the corporation

continued its business undiminished and at a orofit.

Id. at
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889.
This principle an-J t tip m

nrul * -wmort i aq i1 are also

found ii the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Quackenbos,
'H

]

M,

i >n,| ': j

) .

[n that case the company reduced is capital account by
about $400,000, using cash in the same amount to buy stock at the
market vnl\*->,

The taxpayer treated this as a partial liquidation*

The Commissioner oE Internal Revenue contested that
there was not a partial 1iquidation, arguing as do the Equitable
defendants herein that for such to rv;

• •< * must be a winding

up of the corporation, a orocess leadina vo t n a ; liquidation.
The c o n i rejected those arguments, affirming that a partial
liquidation did not require the corporation t» > ''planning a
cessation of business or in the process of final liquidation."
Id. Hi 1V7.
Another example is found in the case of Yankey
v

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 -L ^„ Id 65 0 (101h Ci r. 1945).
In that caap, the issi

corporation formulated a plan

to purchase preferred stock issued in partial payment of debts of
a predecessor corporation.

The Court affirmed that such payments

we re received in partial I i < \ \ \ i d a t i • :»\ i i 11 t h o i ig \ i t here wa; *
to curtai I the normal operations of the corporation.

intention

Ijd. at

652.
Citing the advantage o £ unifoi mi i \ betweei i st ate i :; ix:
laws and federal tax laws, the Alabama Supreme Court in Bashinsky
v. Sparks,

So. 2d 303 (Ala. 1962) found that Alabama's statutory
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definition of partial liquidation also did not require the
corporation's discontinuance of operations.
The cases of Henderson v, United States, 105 F.2d 461
(3rd Cir. 1939); Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 136 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1943); and Dodd
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 131 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1942)
reached similar conclusions.
Liquidation is not defined by statute.
These cases cited above generally deal with tax questions
and statutory definitions of liquidation.

Although these statutory

definitions show that the winding up of a corporation is not
required for there to be a partial liquidation, the applicable
definition of liquidation in the instant matter would not be
restricted to such statutory definitions.

Since the instant

matter does not solely concern tax matters, the finder of fact
will not be confined to the corresponding definitions in deciding
whether there has been "any liquidation" entitling the preferred
shareholders to the same payment per share as the common shareholders.
Rather, the more general common definitions will apply.
The opinion in Thornton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
159 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1947) points out a difference between
a statutory definition of liquidation, and its general definition.
The definition of liquidation in the tax code at that time
included the element that shares be surrendered or endorsed.
Therefore, the general understanding of the word liquidation
was not relevant:

31
If our general understanding of the meaning of
the word liquidation be different, it must
give way to the statutory definition for tax
purposes. ...
Here there was no complete cancellation or
redemption of all or a portion of the stock.
Without it there was no liquidation, partial
or complete. This ends the matter. It may be
that the Mortgage Company at one time intended
to wind up its affairs, and later changed its
mind. It distributed some of the money received
on sale of its assets among its stockholders
including oetitioner. In a broad or general
sense or use of the word, it could have been
described as liquidated. But it was not such
a partial liquidation as Congress defined that
term. Id., at 580-581. (Emphasis added.)
Tn the instant matter, there need not be any such unnatural
definition applied to "any liquidation."

There is no unilateral

soecial definition that must be employed and might thereby end the
matter.
Rather, the trier of fact can and should be allowed to
look at all of the pertinent facts and decide whether "any liquidation"
took place when Equitable bought out the holders of about one-third
of the stock of II, a company which held about 80% of Equitablefs
stock, without there being a rigid requirement such as the shares
being cancelled.

The trier of fact can make this determination by

looking at the substance of the transaction, not just the form.
3.

A COMTRMhhKD COMPANY AND ITS OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS

ARE NOT INSULATED BY ARTIFICIALITIES FROM ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs are owed no duty bv
Equitable or its officers and directors as such, because plaintiffs
hold stock in the holding company II, not in Equitable itself.
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ROA at 408.
The principles which should govern this issue are set
forth in the case of Brown v. Tenneyy 532 N.E.2d 230 (111. 1988).
In that case, the subsidiary defended a derivative action on the
basis that the plaintiff was a shareholder in the holding company,
not the subsidiary.
The court pointed out that to accept the subsidiary's
defense would leave a shareholder of the holding company without a
remedy even where the holding company was the wrongdoer which
caused the subsidiary to take the wrongful action.

Just by having

an additional layer, the wrongdoer would be insulated.
does not permit such devices.

The law

Id[. at 233.

The court went on to emphasize the fact that the people
were real, not the corporate forms, "For beneath the corporate
cloak beats the heart of its shareholders."

Ld. at 234.

The court then addressed the fact that where the holding
company and subsidiary share common directors, there is even more
reason for concern.
Such interlocking directorates present special
problems, and the dealings between the two
corporations must be watched with a jaundiced
eye.
... In other words, according to the
plaintiff, the subsidiary is accountable
to no one since its shareholder, the holding
company, is controlled by the wrongdoers.
There is no justice in denying relief under
these circumstances, and this court may look
through the coroorate form. Ld. at 235.
Additional principles applicable in the instant matter
on this issue are set forth in the case of Kwick Set Components,
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Inc. v, Davidson Industries , Inc. , 41] So. 2<1 I M i A 1 a . I (J|R2 ) . In
that case the dominant corporation was found liable for a debt of
the subservient corporation.
The court in that case stated that the legal fiction
should not allow evasion of responsibility, or to permit any
inequitable result.
[T]he legal fiction of separate corporate
entity should not be so extended "as to enable
the corporation to become a vehicle to evade
just responsibility." [Citation]. The theory
of separate corporate existence can properly be
discarded, even in the absence of fraud, to
prevent injustice or inequitable consequences.
[Citation]. Id., at 136.
It then stated that the instrumentality doctrine would
be applicable when the dominant corporation controlled the subservient
corporation, and the dominant corporation proximately cause the
action complained of.
In the instant matter, the entire transaction complained
about pertained to control.

All factions of the Ross family decided

not to continue to fight over that control, but rather to use
their instrumentalities to resolve the matter.

Control was represented

by ownership of Equitable stock, directly and through ownership of
stock in other entities, particularly in II.
because of that control through

It was directly

that their decis,

could be

implemented by Equitable giving consideration to the sellers in
excess of 4 1/2 million dollars in a transaction committing Equitable
for a period of about 10 years.
To assert, as the defendants do (ROA at 409) that II was
not involved in the decision to enter into this transaction and
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Equitable acted independently is ludicrous.

Reality dictates it

happened otherwise.
Likewise it is disingenuous to assert that the case of
Richardson v. Arizona Fuelsy 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980) stands for
the proposition that directors can, with impunity, use the corporate
assets at any time to preferentially benefit only the majority
shareholders, provided there is no loss to the corporation.

ROA

at 408-409.
4.

A CORPORATION IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SECRETLY PURCHASING

ALL OF CERTAIN INSIDERS1 PREFERRED STOCK OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY,
AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE PRICE THE OTHER
HOLDERS OF THAT STOCK COULD OBTAIN FROM THE CORPORATION OR ANYONE
ELSE, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER A CORPORATION'S
CONTROL, DESPITE THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE.
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs' II preferred shares.
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs1 II
preferred shares at the same price and on the same terms as those
applicable to its purchase of II preferred shares from the defendants
Galen J. Ross, David E. Ross II, Betsy Ross Rapps, and Connie Ross.
Its failure to make such an offer was, on its face, a
breach of the duty owed by defendants, both as directors and as
controlling stockholders, to the plaintiffs.
Many of the principles on which this statement is based
are found in the seminal case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
In that case, Rodd Electrotype was a corporation in
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which the Rodd family held the majority of the stock, and the plaintiff
the minor portion.

When Harry Rodd reached the age of 77, he had

conveyed most of his stock to his children.

He was now ready to

convert some of his remaining stockholdings to cash and retire.
At about this same time, Joseph Donahue passed away.

He had

worked in the company as well and held the minority interest.
The company reached an agreement with Harry Rodd to buy
45 of his 81 shares of stock for a price reflecting the book value
and liquidating value of that stock, namely $800 a share. The
corporation declined to buy the 50 shares held by the Donahues on
the same terms.

Joseoh Donahue's widow held 45 of those 50 shares,

and she sued because the offer to sell her shares was rejected.
The court first found that the company was a close
corporation, based on the fact that it had few stockholders,
little market for corporate stock, and substantial majority stockholder
participation in the management, direction and operation of the
corporation.

;[d. at 511.

It found that due to the similarity with a partnership,
the stockholders of a close corporation must have a relationship
of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty,

^d. at 512, 515-518.

The court stated that the corporate form makes the
minority stockholders vulnerable to oppressive devices, or
"freeze-outs."

These devices include refusal to declare dividends

and draining off earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and
bonuses to the majority shareholders-officers.

JA. at 513.

The result of such oporessive devices is that the minority
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stockholders must either wait and passively suffer the losses, or
seek a buyer at whatever price they can get.

_Id. at 514. Since

an outsider would not knowingly buy into such a position, the
minority must sell to the majority for less than fair value, and
that is when the majority has won by these tactics.

.Id. at 515.

Thus, when a close corporation buys its own stock, those
causing this purchase must act with the utmost qood faith and
loyalty to the other shareholders.

This means they must make

them the same offer, so that there is no disproportionate benefit
to the majority.

IdL at 518.

By this means, the minority can also receive the benefits
of the purchase by the corporation.

Those benefits include providing

a market for their shares and having access to corporate assets
for personal use, transforming an illiquid investment into a
liquid one.

Id.

If only the members of the majority group were to receive
such benefits, there would be a preferential distribution of
assets, which would be inconsistent with the strict fiduciary
duty.

Id. at 519.
The case of Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978),

discusses some of these same principles in a similar factual setting.
The facts in the instant matter show that here also the
defendants had a duty to authorize Equitable to purchase the
plaintiffs' stock at the same price and on the same terms given to
the insider sellers.
In this case as in the cases cited, the holders of less
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than half of the controlling interest were willing to sell their
stock to the corporation at what was perceived to be its true
value•

The corporation agreed to buy their stock at that value,

while making no such offer to the minority stockholders.

This

benefited those who had been part of the majority stockholders by
giving them a market for their stock and making it liquid, while
allowing the remainder of the majority stockholders to maintain
control.
This case also involves a close corporation.
family has controlled the companies and still does.

The Ross

The remaining

shareholders are few in number, especially when compared to public
corporations.

There is no market for plaintiffs1 stock.

The

majority shareholders are directors and officers and participate
substantially in the management, direction and operation of the
corporation.
Not only has the purchase reduced the amount available
for dividends, but dividends have historically not been declared,
which was one of the hallmarks of oppression by the majority.
Other hallmarks showing that oppression include the high salaries
enjoyed by the majority shareholders/directors/officers and the
fact that those not wishing to wait longer than 40 years for a
return on their investment have had to sell it to the major
stockholders for far below the value it represents.
Defendants are not excused by the business judgment rule.
Defendants argue that the purchase of II preferred stock
was justified on the basis of the business judgment rule, that is,
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because of the presumption that the directors acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.

ROA at 413-14,

citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984).
Defendants state that the presumption cannot be rebutted
because "the actions of the Equitable board were motivated by the
business judgment of its board that the buying out of the dissident
stockholders was necessary to maintain the very existence of the
corporation."

ROA at 413.

However, the said Aronson case cited by defendants names
certain conditions under which the business judgment rule will
a

PPT-Yf including the condition that the directors be disinterested.

Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 812.
director independence.

In addition, there must be

This is inherent in the presumption that

actions are taken for business, rather than extraneous, reasons.
Id. at 816.
One of the more common reasons a director may not be
disinterested, and one of the more common extraneous considerations,
is the natural desire of a director and his fellow directors to
maintain control.
Another case cited by defendants, Cheff v. Mathes, 199
A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964), states that there is no such presumption
of good faith when a threat to control is involved and the directors
authorize corporate funds to be used for a purchase of the shares
of the corporation.

In such an instance the burden is on the director

to show the action was taken in good faith.
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In the case of proxy fightsf the courts "have not sanctioned
the use of corporate funds to advance the selfish desires of
directors to perpetuate themselves in office."

And if the board

causes the corporation to buy out a dissident stockholder "solely
or primarily because of a desire to perpetuate themselves in
office, the use of corporate funds for such purposes is improoer."
Id.
The said shift in burden was applied in the case of
Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1978).

The defendants

in that case made the conclusory statement that the stock purchase
was necessary "to meet the real and immediate threat to the
corporation."

The only evidence supporting that statement was

testimony that a change in management would be disastrous at a
time when the whole industry was in a very bad way. Therefore,
the appellate court cited the Cheff case in finding that they had
"failed to carry their burden of proving that the purhcase was
made primarily in the corporate interest."

.Id. at 1004.

On the other hand, their was sufficient evidence to support
the finding of the trial court that the defendants' primary purpose
for directing the company to purchase its own shares was to perpetuate
their control of the company, and that was unlawful.

Id., at

1004-5.
In the instant matter, there are likewise numerous facts
which show that defendants' primary purpose for expending corporate
funds to purchase shares of II was to maintain the status quo as
far as the control of Equitable.
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The first gambit was made by Earl's family and Rod
when they approved the sale of a large portion of the Foundation's
holding of II stock to an individual favorable to them.

Then

there was the Bennett Leasing agreement and Equitable's offer to
buy its own stock.

This latter move by Equitable seems to have

been motivated by the possibility of a dissolution of II, since
otherwise control of II meant control of Equitable.
Then there were the lawsuits putting in issue the legality
of what had been done, including the legality of the sale of stock
by the Foundation.

Finally the issue of control was resolved by

Equitablefs purchase of all of the Equitable and related holdings
of the members of the Ross family, other than Earl's family and Rod.
Counsel for the Equitable defendants admitted that Equitable
purchased equitable stock from members of the Ross family "to
thwart a takeover attempt by Bennett Leasing" and to "make sure
that the selling group ... would not trv this again, and sell
Equitable down the river, and initiate another hostile takeover
attempt."

ROA at 74 2-43.
Even if in the face of all of this evidence that the orimary

purpose of the stock purchase was to maintain control, the defendants
believe they can carry their burden of showing otherwise, they
have to do so before a finder of fact.

They certainly cannot

prevail on this issue as a matter of law without a trial.
. 5.

EVERY ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE

OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION NEED NOT BE BROUGHT AS A
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DERIVATIVE ACTION.
Defendants argue that any claim against them belongs to
II or Equitable, and can therefore only be brought as a derivative
action.

ROA at 414-17.
It is true that if the rights belong to a corporation,

shareholders can generally only enforce those corporate rights by
means of a derivative action.

The case cited by the defendants,

Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980), orovides
an excellent analysis in this respect.

In that case, the Court

analyzed all of the claims asserted and found that each one of
them was based on rights possessed solely by the corporation.
It is not true that the claims asserted by the plaintiffs
in the instant matter belong solely to the corporations, and it is
not alleged that they belong to any corporation at all.
Equitable apparently paid a fair price for the stock of
II and so it was not damaged.

Likewise, II does not appear to

have been damaged since the value of the Equitable stock it holds
apparently remained unchanged.
Thus, under the principles enunciated in the Richardson
case, plaintiff could not have brought a derivative action by
reason of Equitablefs purchase of II stock.
However, that case stated that shareholders could have
direct claims as individuals which might be appropriately pursued
in the context of a class action.

l^d. at 638.

The case then quoted Fletcher as stating that it is an
individual action when the injury is not one to the corporation as
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a whole, but to the shareholder individually.

Id., at 639.

Plaintiffs1 Complaints set forth facts and claims which
show that the rights of the plaintiffs and the other members of the
class they represent, held in their individual capacities, were
violated by all of the defendants working together.

These rights

do not belong to either corporation nor to all of the shareholders
of either corporation, but only to the stockholders in the described
class.
As was stated in the case of Horizon House - Microwave,
Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Mass. App. 1985):
To the degree that the gravamen of Emil's
action was abuse of fiduciary duty by a majority
stockholder, he was not required to bring a
minority stockholder's derivative suit against
Microwave but could move against that corporation
and William directly.
6.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED AGAINST THE OFFICERS

AND DIRECTORS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY WHEN ONLY EQUITABLE
RELIEF INVOLVING THE COMPANY, AND NO GENERAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES FROM THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, IS SPECIFIED IN THE PRAYER.
Equitable relief suffices.
Defendants argued that punitive damages are not available
in a suit in equity, citing the Colorado Appellate case of Seal
v. Hart, 755 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1988) dealing with rescission of
a sale of a cabin.

ROA at 53.

However, it is not the law in Utah

that punitive damages are never permitted in a suit in equity.
In the case of Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah
1978), the trial court had ruled as a matter of law that ounitive
damages were unavailable in a suit in equity for specific performance
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and rescission.

This was reversed.

Defendants also have contended that punitive damages are
not recoverable absent general or compensatory damages.
53, 406.

ROA at

The case cited for this proposition, Atkin Wright &

Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), did not
deal with an action in equity, but rather an action at law based
on an error in the yellow cages and remedial measures taken,
in which a jury tried the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages.
Furthermore, the Atkin opinion did not even address the
case of Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 535 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) referred
to above, let alone overrule that case.
There is no statutory bar.
Also, the statute quoted by the defendants (ROA at 406),
Section 78-18-1(1)(a) of the Utah Code, would not preclude an
award of punitive damages.
That statute generally requires an award of compensatory
or general damages as a condition for an award of punitive damages.
In the instant matter, a legally protected interest of
the plaintiff has been violated by these individual defendants.
It may well be that just and equitable relief will include compensation
from these defendants for actual damages.

As indicated below,

plaintiffs are entitled to the appropriate relief whether or not
it is specified in the prayer.

This aporopriate relief could

certainly include an award of compensatory or general damages
sufficient to satisfy any statutory orerequisite for awarding
ounitive damages.
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It would not be surprising at all for the finder of fact
to find it appropriate to charge all of the defendantsf jointly
and severally, with the obligation to compensate the plaintiffs
for the results of the breach of their fiduciary duty, including
compensation for interest, the frustration and other mental anguish,
and other consequences of the delay by defendants in discharging
their obligations.
There appears to be no Utah case law interpreting this
statute.

The statutory exception to the general common law rules

allowing punitive damages, as in the case of any other such exception,
should be narrowly construed.
It would be anomalous indeed for a court to find under
this statute that there had been no general or compensatory damages
awarded in a case where the plaintiff class prevailed and thus
gained and in large part exercised an option to have Equitable pay
hundreds of thousands of dollars more for their stock than the class
could have received otherwise.

Likewise it would be anomalous to

find there had been no general or compensatory damages awarded
against the named individual defendants even though the value of
their financial holdings decreased proportionally to that same extent.
The prayer need not be specific.
The prayer of plaintiffs' Complaints demands "such other
relief as the Court may deem just and equitable."

Thus there is

included in the prayer a demand for compensatory and general
damages to the extent the Court deems them to be just.
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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states in part:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment
is entered by default, every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings.
This rule was cited and quoted in part in Behrens v. Raleigh
Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), as justification
for the conclusion in that case that "if the plaintiff were able
to adduce the necessary foundational evidence at trial, she could
claim punitive damages under Rule 54(c) without a formal amendment
of the pleadings."

Id.

at 1182.

The Behrens case also quoted on this point 6 J. Moore,
W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice. 1[54.60 at 1212 14 (2d ed. 1983), in part as follows:
[A] pleading should not be dismissed for legal
insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty
that the claimant is entitled to no relief, legal,
equitable or maritime, under any state of
facts which could be proved in support of the
claim, irrespective of the prayer for relief;
and, except as to a judgment by default, the
prayer does not limit the relief, legal,
equitable or maritime, which the court may
grant. [Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.]
7.

PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS

TO ALLEGE ADDITIONAL ACTS OF OPPRESSION AGAINST THE MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AND TO SPECIFICALLY CLAIM A RIGHT TO A PARTIAL RESCISSION
OF A SALE OF STOCK WHEN THE CASE WAS STILL IN THE DISCOVERY AND
MOTION STAGE.
Defendants acknowledged that Rule 15 of the Utah Rules
of CiviL Procedure provides that when a party seeks to amend his
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pleading, "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
ROA at 568.
Claims previously denied can be reiterated.
The defendants argued that the proposed Amended Complaint
should not have been allowed because it included claims that had
already been adjudicated, including the claim for class certification
and the claim that there had been a liquidation.

ROA at 569.

Any amended complaint relates back to the start of: the
lawsuit.

Plaintiffs should not have to run the risk of being

deemed to have waived their rights with respect to the class and
liquidation claims by omitting them in an amended complaint.
Therefore the proposed Amended Complaint contained
allegations pertaining to the certification of a class and the
partial liquidation of II, although the court had made rulings adverse
to these claims.

However, the court would not have changed the

law of the case by allowing the filing of the Amended Complaint,
especially if the order of allowance specifically so indicated.
In any event, the law of the case would not preclude
certification of the class.

Kas v. Financial General Bankshares,

Inc., 105 F.R.O. 453 (D.C. 1984); 3B Moore's Federal Practice, (2d
ed.) l[23.07[ll at 23-190.
As to the prayer of the Amended Complaint, the Order of
the trial court concerning liquidation dated October 24, 1990 did
not preclude the remedy of liquidation.

It merely stated that

plaintiffs could not rely upon the claimed partial liquidation of
II to justify the relief sought.

ROA at 317.
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Disallowance of: amendment could cause deprivation of claims.
Defendants have also argued that new claims should not be
allowed added at this point.

ROA at 569.

In view of the fact that all of the claims arise in
whole or in part from the same transactions or occurrences/ there
may be res judicata effect on all of these claims even if not all
are pursued.

That is, if the applicants do not pursue some of the

claims contained in the Amended Complaint, and then file a later
action on those remaining claims, the court hearing that later
action may find those claims could and should have been litigated
in this action, in which case they would be barred on the basis of
the claim preclusion branch of res judicata.

Penrod v. Nu Creation

Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).
Claims exist on the basis of oppressive conduct.
With respect to plaintiffs1 claims on the basis of
oppressive conduct, defendants essentially have moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
ROA at 569.
They state that as a matter of law, there could not have
been oppressive conduct.

They state that the defendants followed

the law and were legally endowed with the discretion they exercised
and in no way could there have been oppressive conduct under these
facts.
In other words, they contend that it does not matter that
the plaintiffs could not sell their stock for even as much as
l/16th of its liquidation valae while defendants used assets of
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Equitable to pay members of the controlling group 100% of that
liquidation value for exactly the same stock.
They would have this Court believe and rule that it does
not matter that over 25 years passed without a dividend, and that
it has been over 8 years since the last dividend, with the dividend
paid three of the years between those periods equalling $.06 per
share each year it was paid, an annual return for those years of
less than l/10th of a percent of the stock's liquidation valae.
It cannot be so easily determined, and certainly not as
a matter of law, that such conduct is not oppressive.

Tn large

measure, that is because, and appropriately so, oopressive conduct
is not a rigidly and narrowly defined concept.
In the case of McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Sons, Inc.,
724 P. 2d 232, 236 (Nf.M. App. 1986), the court stated that "oporassive"
conduct "is an expansive term that is used to cover a multitude of
situations dealing with improper conduct."

The advantage of

not having sharply defined rules allows courts to equitably and
carefully examine whether shareholders are not receiving the
treatment they reasonably should be able to expect from those
owing them a fiduciary duty.

Id.

Oppressive conduct is distinguised from, and does not
necessarily include, illegal or fraudulent behavior.

It may

include situations where the minority shareholder cannot particioate
in the operation and management of the corporation.

It may be

where the majority has an "imperious attitude" and/or follows an
"arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed course of conduct" sufficient
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to show oppression.

Tjd. at 237.

Right to amend the prayer to include various remedies
As mentioned above, defendants urged on several occasions
that since no relief except for punitive damages was demanded from
several defendants, no relief could be granted.
However, olaintiffs are entitled to appropriate relief,
whether included in the prayer or not.

It follows a fortiori that

they should be allowed to amend the prayer to include that appropriate
relief.

Such an amendment would serve to make more specific

the part of the prayer of plaintiffs' Complaints which demands
"such other relief as the Court may deem just and equitable."
There are many appropriate remedies for oooressive
conduct found in pertinent cases. For example, the cases of
McCauley, supra, (defendants had their choice of three options:
(1) liquidation of the corporation; (2) partition and reorganization;
or (3) purchase by the corporation of plaintiff's outstanding
shares); Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903 (Or. Apo. 1989) (defendants
required to buy the plaintiffs' interests in the company); and Stefano
v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985) (buy-out ordered at a soecific
price, an equitable remedy less drastic than dissolution).
In an early Utah case, Union Savings & Investment
Co. v. District Court of Utah, 44 Utah 397, 410, 140 Pac. 221 (Utah
1914), the Court discussed the existence of a broad range of
remedies, other than dissolution, that courts could employ in
actions brought by shareholders.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court should have certified the plaintiff
class under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and not given the members of the class any right to opt out of
the class.
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that
there was not "any liquidation" as that term was used in the
Amended Articles of Incorporation, and thus that there was no
requirement to evenly allocate the funds paid to the II shareholders.
The existence of a holding company should not impair the
rights of the shareholders.

These rights include the right to

share pro rata in any distribution of assets.

Directors cannot

excuse a distribution benefiting only certain shareholders where
their purpose was to maintain control.
Where there has been discrimination against certain
shareholders, these shareholders have a cause of action which is
not just derivative.

They also have a cause of action for punitive

damages against all involved in a breach of fiduciary duty even
though their main remedy may be equitable.
The shareholders had a right to add a cause based on
oppressive conduct, and to otherwise amend their complaint, especially
where for the most part the relevant facts were pled in the original
complaint.
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ADDENDUM
Rule 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a class action.

One or more members of a

class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are tyoical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Class action maintainable.

An action may be maintained as

a class action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injuctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
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(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.

The matters pertinent to the

findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action,
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained;
notice; judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be maintained.

An order under this subdivision

may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision
on the merits.
(2)

In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3),

the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.

The

notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the

3
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under Subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom
the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class*
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be contrued and
applied accordingly.

ION CONCERNING PARENT. SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES
A. The Company i s controlled by Insurance Investment Company, a Utah corporation, which owns 63% of the issued and outstanding common stock of the Company. Insurance
ivtstment hat two classes of stock. There are 25,000 shares, voting stock and 77,177.5 shares of 6% noncumulativt. nonvoting, $1.00 par value of preferred stock. Ownership
id control of this voting stock i s described in Schedule Y, Organizational Chart.
I. Tha Company owns 11,502.23 voting shares and 25,050 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Corporation.
C. During 1986. the Board of Directors of Equitable l i f t and Casualty Insurance Company (hereafter the 'Company") determined that i t would be in i t s best interest
5 purchase some of the Company's outstanding common stock and the common and preferred stock of Insurance Investment Company, the Company's parent corporation. The
tah DeparUnent of Insurance was notified of this intent and gave i t s consent to the same where necessary. The stock purchase program would s a t i s f y any or all of the following
jrposes:
(1) To create a market for stockholders desiring to s e l l their stock of the Company who have been unable to do so in the past because of lack of marketability.
(2) To reduce the cost of communication to stockholders.
(3) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for employee benefit program.
(4) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for use in the acquisition of other companies.
(5) To increase the percentage of ownership of Insurance Investment Company in the Company. Such an increase would permit Insurance Investment Company to qualify
for the 100 percent dividend exclusion for federal income tax purposes and/or e n t i t l e Insurance Investment Company to f i l e a consolidated return with the Company.
(5) To eliminate the Company's appearance as a potential candidate for an outside takeover. The Company's publicly held stock gave the appearance to uninformed
individuals that i t was possible to purchase control of the Company by offering to purchase the Company's publicly held stock. Although i t was believed that such
attempts were f u t i l e , such attempts were nevertheless being made, and were extremely disruptive and detrimental to the operation of the Company.
On November 17, 1966, the Company i n i t i a t e d the above purchase plan by s o l i c i t i n g from i t s shareholders offers to s e l l to the Company up to 115,500 shares of i t s outstanding
1.00 par value common shares for $22.50 per share. The Company acquired 95,652.43 common shares under the s o l i c i t a t i o n and subsequent purchases for an aggregate cash
onsideration of $2,152,404.
On October 31, 19S7, the Company entered into an agreement with a coalition of some of i t s remaining shareholders wherein the Company agreed to purchase 44,544.37 shares of
ts comron stock, 25,050.66 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Company, 11,802.23 common shares of Insurance Investment Company and 9.793.10 common shares of National Housing,
-elated corporation, for $1,450,000 cash and the issuance of 363,000 shares of the Company's ne»ly authorized $2.00 par value preferred stock. The Company was required to purchase
11 of this various stock in order to purchase any of i t .
Effective April 15, 19&6, National Mousing was merged into the Company. As a result of the merger, the Company acquired 7,365.65 shares of i t s cocoon stock, 4,315 preferred
hires of Insurance Investment Company and $662,095 in net a s s e t s , based upon their appraised fair value. In consideration for which, the Company paid $150,000 cash and issued
10,000 shares of the Company's preferred stock.
The total consideration paid by the Company under the above acquisitions is comprised of $3,752,404 cash and 403,000 shares of $2.00 par value preferred stock with an assigned
.ost of $9.229 per share (the Kinircuit redemption p r i c e ) . Since $662,095 of nonstock assets were received in the National Housing Kerger, the total assigned cost for the treasury
itock acquired is $6,609,596 (J3.752.404 cash • $3,719,287 (assigned value of preferred stock) — $662,095 (net value of nonstock assets acquired)). The aggregate consideration
>f $6,609,596 has leer, assigned to the cost of connon treasury stock attributable to the above transaction for financial reporting purposes. During 19W, the Cor^any redeemed
J6.803.35 shares of i t s preferred stock at an average cost of $10.71 per share.
The owners of the preltrrt^i stock tuy. in the future, if the Cocrpany has sufficient earnings in the prior year, cause the Company to purchase up to 40,300 shares per year at a
^ric§ of $10.72 p*r share plus (or emus) a percentage of earnings (or losses) presented on line 31 of the Corrpan)'s Annual Statement. Although the Company does not know whether
;>r not this right * i l l be exercised, tne Corrany will record a l i a b i l i t y as a write-in iten appearing or page 3 of i t s Annual Statement identifying i t s potential l i a b i l i t y for the
jutsequert year's purchase. This procedure of recording this l i a b i l i t y has Uren renewed and approved b> the Utah Department of Insurance.
Tha Corpany's holding of treasury shares consists of 147,573.08 shares of i t s connon stock which are owned directly by the Company and 153,036.28 shares which are held
indirectly through the Ccxrpiny's 40.3 percent holding (41,167.89 shares) of i t s parent company's capital shares (based on liquidation r i g h t s . Both the directly and indirectly
held shares are dtr^ned to be treasury stock by the Company for financial reporting purposes. The Company is holding such shares as treasury stock to satisfy the previously nentioni
purposes.
The Cocpany has received accounting assistance fror Peat Kar>uk Ham I Co. and le^al assistance fron Fabian & Clendemn in recording these transactions.
D. Tha Corpany has no guaranties or undertikings for the benefit of an a f f i l i a t e which Right result in a material contingent exposure of the Company's or a f f i l i a t e d insurer's
assets to l i a b i l i t y .
£. The Corpan> do*s not have any 1r.ana9er.ent or service contracts of insuring arrangements with an> a f f i l i a t e d insurer.

lb COMPENSATION Ahl RETJREMEKT PUKS
A.

The Corpar.j has an employe* profit sharing plan and a Section 401 (k) plan for the employees. The Company has no retirement plan for i t s agents. The Company's Board of
1
"
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Ms. Mary T. Noonan, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

COURT OF APPEALS
Re:

Pond vs. Equitable
920759-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
I represent the appellants in the reference aooeal. On
their behalf T am submitting this letter to you, with seven copies,
pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Apoellate Procedure
(Citation of Supplemental Authorities).
This letter is the limited response to apoellees' submission
citing that same rule.
The recent opinion in Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance
Co. vs. Ross, No. 910746-CA should not have been suoolementally
cited. This is because it is not a pertinent nor significant
authority. It does not address the legal issues involved in the
referenced appeal. It is not evidence of any factual circumstances,
nor was it before the trial court.
Yours very truly,

LYNN P". HEWARD
Attorney at Law
Copy to:
P. Bruce Badger
215 South State Street #1200
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151

